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RANGKA KERJA UNTUK DIAGNOSIS DAN PEME-
LIHARAAN PRIVASI DALAM PENERBITAN DATA
ABSTRAK
Matlamat pemeliharaan privasi dalam penerbitan data ialah untuk menerbitkan
data dengan melindungi maklumat sulit. Walaupun sekali pandang nampaknya
membuang pengecam terus individu dapat melindungi ketanpanamaan individu tersebut,
namun maklumat sulit boleh didedahkan dengan menyambung data itu kepada data
luaran yang lain. Pemeliharaan privasi mengutarakan isu privasi ini dengan memperke-
nalkan prinsip k-ketanpanamaan dan l-kepelbagaian. Maka teknik pemeliharaan
privasi iaitu algoritma k-ketanpanamaan dan l-kepelbagaian dapat mentransformasikan
data ((misalnya melalui pengitlakan, penindasan atau penyerpihan) untuk melindungi
identiti dan maklumat sensitif seseorang individu.
Kebelakangan ini, sebahagian besar usaha yang dilakukan untuk mengutarakan
isu ini memberi tumpuan pada teknik pemeliharaan privasi. Namun demikian, tidak
banyak usaha dilakukan untuk menghasilkan teknik, alat dan metodologi yang dapat
membantu penerbit, pengurus dan juruanalisis data dalam penyelidikan dan penilaian
risiko privasi. Justeru itu, disarankan idea penubuhan sebuah pusat diagnosis
privasi yang menyediakan rangka kerja yang sewajarnya bagi pendiagnosisan risiko
privasi dan lebih khusus lagi pendiagnosisan k-ketanpanamaan dan l-kepelbagaian.
Masalah ini didapati merupakan suatu masalah penemuan pengetahuan yang dapat
dipetakan kepada rangka kerja yang disarankan oleh Mannila dan Toivonen. Dengan
memperkenalkan dan membuktikan sifat “monotonicity” yang wajar, algoritma “level-
wise” yang wajar berdasarkan algoritma apriori dikemukakan dan dinilai.
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Tambahan pula, model dan teknik yang disarankan untuk pemeliharaan privasi
masih mempunyai beberapa kekurangan dan kelemahan. Secara khususnya, algoritma
berasaskan penggugusan untuk k-ketanpanamaan boleh menyebabkan kehilangan
maklumat yang tinggi. Dengan menunjukkan kekurangan kedua-dua gugusan kecil
dan besar, k-ketanpanamaan penggugusan dua fasa disarankan. Gugusan akan
menjadi cukup besar dan selepas itu gugusan besar dipisahkan kepada gugusan-
gugusan yang sekecil mungkin dalam fasa seterusnya. Ini mengakibatkan kehilangan
maklumat yang rendah. Tambahan pula, ditunjukkan bahawa perluasan algoritma k-
ketanpanamaan bagi prinsip l-kepelbagaian tidak begitu mudah dilakukan. Ia boleh
menyebabkan kehilangan maklumat yang tinggi atau tidak dapat dihentikan. Oleh
sebab itu, disarankan l-kepelbagaian penggugusan baldi untuk menjamin penghentian
dan juga kehilangan maklumat yang rendah.
Algoritma yang disarankan itu telah dilaksana dan menggunakan dua dataset
sampel, iaitu Adults dan OCC, yang merupakan tanda aras de facto bagi algoritma
pemeliharaan privasi. Dengan menganalisis keputusan yang diperoleh, keberkesanan
dan kecekapan rangka kerja dan algoritma yang disarankan telah dapat dibuktikan
secara eksperimen.
xvi
A FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY DIAGNOSIS AND
PRESERVATION IN DATA PUBLISHING
ABSTRACT
Privacy preservation in data publishing aims at the publication of data with
protecting private information. Although removing direct identifier of individuals
seems to protect their anonymity at first glance, private information may be revealed
by joining the data to other external data. Privacy preservation addresses this privacy
issue by introducing k-anonymity and l-diversity principles. Accordingly, privacy
preservation techniques, namely k-anonymization and l-diversification algorithms,
transform data (for example by generalization, suppression or fragmentation) to protect
identity and sensitive information of individuals respectively.
Most of the recent efforts addressing this issue have focused on privacy preservation
techniques. However, not much effort has been made to address devising techniques,
tools and methodologies to assist data publishers, managers and analysts in their
investigation and evaluation of privacy risks. Hence, the idea of a privacy diagnosis
centre is proposed that offers the necessary framework for diagnosing privacy risk
and specifically k-anonymity and l-diversity. It is shown that this problem is a
knowledge discovery problem that can be mapped to the framework proposed by
Mannila and Toivonen. By introducing and proving the necessary monotonicity
properties, necessary levelwise algorithms based on the apriori algorithm are presented
and evaluated.
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Moreover, proposed models and techniques for privacy preservation still have
some deficiencies and drawbacks. Specifically, clustering-based algorithms for k-
anonymization may result in high information loss. By showing the deficiencies
of both small and big clusters, two-phase clustering k-anonymization is proposed.
It allows clusters to become sufficiently big, and big clusters are split to smallest
possible clusters in the next phase, both result in lower information loss. In addition,
it is shown that the extension of k-anonymization algorithms for some l-diversity
principles is not straightforward. It may result in high information loss or can not
terminate. Accordingly, bucket clustering l-diversification is proposed to guarantee
both termination and low information loss.
The proposed algorithms are implemented and ran on two sample datasets, namely
Adults and OCC, which have become de facto benchmarks for privacy preservation
algorithms. Effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed framework and algorithms
are proved experimentally by analyzing the results.
xviii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
In the age of information with exponential growth in the number and variety of
data collections containing person-specific information, there is also tremendous
demand for person-specific data. It is not only necessary for applications such
as data mining, cost analysis and fraud detection, but also for other fields of
research such as health care, risk analysis, insurance stability and so on. These
data recipients are usually named third parties in the process of data publishing.
Besides, organizations and professionals need to publish operational data in
order to ensure business visibility and effective presence on the World Wide
Web. Individuals publish personal data in the hope of becoming socially visible
and attractive in the new electronic communication forums. Consequently,
large amounts of data with high level of details in the numerous sources are
publicly available, which is usually named microdata. This may make privacy
of individuals at risk. For example, even though the data may locally seem to
respect privacy, cross-referencing with external data and statistical inferences can
disclose more information than intended. Hence, privacy preservation in data
publishing has become one of the most important research problems during the
last decade. It addresses protecting privacy of individual entities to whom the
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data belong. Organizations and companies want or need to share person-level data
with keeping as much details as possible while making sure the information is
sufficiently protected. This protection is necessary to prevent identity and sensitive
information disclosure while detailed information of individuals is published
(Oliveira and Zaiane, 2007; Aggarwal and Yu, 2008).
Typically, person-specific data (microdata) is stored in a table where each row
(tuple) corresponds to one individual. This table has 4 kinds of attributes:
• Attributes like “Name”, “Social security number” or “Driving license number”
that uniquely identify individuals. They are referred to as identity.
• Attributes like “Income” for bank customers or “Disease” for hospital
patients that are important for data holder, but have to be remained private
for individuals. These attributes are named sensitive attributes.
• Set of attributes like {Age, Gender, Zip-code} that can be used by combination
to identify some individuals. They are named quasi-identifiers.
• Other attributes that do not fall into the previous categories and the data
holder can publish them without considering any protection. These attributes
are named normal attributes or non-sensitive attributes.
Any privacy preservation process is started by protecting direct identity of
individuals. They are generally removed or replaced by random values, the process
which is named de-identification. However, this may not be enough because such
de-identified data can sometimes be joined with other public databases (which
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are usually named external data) on some combination of attributes to re-identify
individuals who are supposed to remain anonymous. In literatures, for example
(Sweeney, 2002b; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; LeFevre et al., 2006a), this kind of
attack is named re-identification, joining attack or cross-referencing. Accordingly,
the attributes combination which make this join possible and result in identity
leakage are named quasi-identifier (Byun et al., 2006a; Sweeney, 2002b; Xu et al.,
2006b). As a real case, Sweeney [2002] empirically showed that 87% of the people
in the U.S. can be uniquely identified by the combination of “Gender”, “Date of
birth”, and “Zip-code”; thus, {Gender, Date of birth, Zip-code} forms a quasi-
identifier for the U.S. population (Sweeney, 2002b). She could reveal disease of
William Weld, governor of the state of Massachusetts, by joining public voter list
and published medical database on this set of attributes, as shown in Figure 1.1.
The uniqueness of such attributes combination leads to cross-referencing where
data is re-identified by joining to publicly available datasets.
Figure 1.1: Linking (join attack) for re-identifying data (Sweeney, 2002b)
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Example 1 (Private table and de-identification).
Consider Table 1.1 showing patient records of a fictitious hospital. Its de-identified
version is also shown in Table 1.2. Although it seems de-identified data is protected
at first glance, an adversary still can attack the data and in which the “Name”, and
subsequently the “Disease” of the patients may be disclosed. In fact, this is feasible
when only one joinable record exists in an external table with one of the records
in the published data. Such external table can be a voter list such as shown in
Table 1.3 below. In this example, one can reveal “Alice” by using combination of
attributes {Zip, Gender, Age} and joining two tables since value of these attributes
set is unique for her.
Table 1.1: Patient records of a fictitious hospital
Name Age Gender Zip Disease
Alice 21 Female 17651 Cancer
Jack 22 Male 17652 Flu
Jan 23 Male 17661 HIV
Bob 24 Male 17662 HIV
Table 1.2: De-identified table of patient records
Age Gender Zip Disease
21 Female 17651 Cancer
22 Male 17652 Flu
23 Male 17661 HIV
24 Male 17662 HIV
Table 1.3: Voters list as external data
Name Address Gender Age Zip
... ... ... ... ... ...
Alice No15, Lakeside Street Female 21 17651
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1.2 Motivation
To prevent cross-referencing or join attacks, initial data is modified before release.
The modification has to keep as much details in the data as possible, which is
referred to as data utility; while still ensuring the information is sufficiently de-
identified, which is referred to as data privacy. Intuitively, data privacy can be
enhanced by hiding more data values, but it decreases data utility. On the other
hand, revealing more data values increases data utility, but it normally decreases
data privacy. Thus, as also proposed by Li and Li (2009), it is necessary to devise
solutions that best address both utility and privacy requirements of data.
Two main principles of privacy preservation in data publishing are known as
k-anonymity and l-diversity. k-anonymity, as defined and used in (Aggarwal et al.,
2006, 2005; Bayardo and Agrawal, 2005; LeFevre et al., 2005; Samarati, 2001;
Samarati and Sweeney, 1998), guarantees that any record in the released data
is indistinguishable from at least k− 1 other records with respect to the quasi-
identifier. Hence, a join with a k-anonymous table would give k or more matches
and create confusion. Then, an individual is hidden in a crowd of size k and has
k-anonymity. The process of modification resulting in this principle is named
k-anonymization. This requirement is typically enforced through generalization,
where real values are replaced with “less specific but semantically consistent
values” (Sweeney, 2002a). For example, Table 1.4 shows 2-anonymous version of
the tuples of Table 1.2 after generalization. It is clear that even an adversary knows
“Alice” as one of the two persons in the first group, however, he/she now cannot
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infer which one is exactly “Alice” and therefore which disease she has contracted,
i.e. “Cancer” or “Flu”.
Table 1.4: 2-anonymous version of Table 1.2
Age Gender Zip Disease
[21-22] * 1765* Cancer
[21-22] * 1765* Flu
[23-24] Male 1766* HIV
[23-24] Male 1766* HIV
While k-anonymity prevents identity of individuals from being revealed in
published data, it fails to protect sensitive information of individuals. For example,
if an adversary knows “Bob” is one of the last two tuples of Table 1.4, even though
he/she cannot understand which one belongs to “Bob”, he/she can infer that he has
been infected by “HIV” with 100 percent confidence. This is due to the fact that
both persons in his group have the same disease.
l-diversity (Li et al., 2007; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Xiao and Tao, 2006a;
Iyengar, 2002) aims at privacy preservation by preventing inferences of unwanted
information. It guarantees that one cannot associate an object with the sensitive
information beyond a certain probability. This is achieved by ensuring that
values of sensitive attributes are well represented as per the l-diversity principle
announced in (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006). The process of modification resulting
in this principle is named l-diversification. Table 1.5 shows 2-diverse version of
the Table 1.2. In the table, each group of tuples has 2 different sensitive values
(disease in this example), thus the actual disease of patients cannot be inferred
with probability more than 12 .
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Table 1.5: 2-diverse version of Table 1.2
Age Gender Zip Disease
[21-23] * 176** Cancer
[21-23] * 176** HIV
[22-24] Male 176** Flu
[22-24] Male 176** HIV
The term privacy concerned in this study is about the anonymity of private
information for individuals while the detailed information is published. It
addresses protection of identity and sensitive information of individuals in the
published data. The term privacy preservation is a process of data modification
to achieve the demand level of the privacy before one publishes the data.
Most of the recent efforts addressing the issue of privacy focused on privacy
preservation. However, fewer efforts have been made to devise techniques, tools
and methodologies that assist data publishers, managers and analysts in their
investigation and evaluation of privacy risks. This is the motivation for proposing
and introducing idea of privacy diagnosis. In fact, we have to know the privacy
risks before any modification could be done. Thus, measuring the privacy level
that exist in the data and showing privacy threats to the data holder are necessary.
Privacy diagnosis, as an upstream of privacy preservation, tries to answer the
questions about the existing level of anonymity, and privacy threats in the data,
based on different privacy aspects and principles.
Besides, although some of the new efforts in anonymization exploit clustering
technique, the attention to the methods and capability and enhancement that they
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may offer is not completely studied. They may result in low data quality or high
information loss. Therefore, this study tries to provide an enhanced modification of
clustering-based algorithm for k-anonymization. Moreover, some of the recently
proposed approaches trying to extend k-anonymization to support l-diversity fail
to address various principles such as frequency l-diversity. It can not be done
straightforwardly as they may not successfully terminate. This is the motivation of
the research to propose an algorithm for frequency l-diversification.
1.3 Goals, objectives and scope
This research aims at both privacy diagnosis and privacy preservation which are
two important phases in safe data publishing process. The former is used by data
holder before starting any modification to show privacy risks. The latter can be
used to improve data privacy for achieving the level of privacy demanded, if it
is not satisfactory. In the first phase, one needs to analyze the data to measure
privacy risks and show to data holder. In fact, we propose a framework to
investigate privacy risks before any modification methods can be exploited. We
show the necessity of this important phase of the data publishing which is currently
still not addressed by most researches. For the privacy preservation phase, we
will introduce algorithms for both k-anonymity and l-diversity principles using
clustering-based techniques.
To achieve the above goals, we investigate the state-of-the-art k-anonymity and
l-diversity principles to address following objectives:
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• To introduce a privacy diagnosis centre for measuring k-anonymity and l-
diversity level in data. Such diagnosis centre will prepare:
– Good understanding of the quasi-identifiers for the given dataset.
– Understanding the effect of different choices of k for the given dataset.
– Possible minimal suppression for achieving a desired level of k-anonymity.
– Understanding the threat of attribute disclosure in the given dataset.
– Measuring the level of guaranteed diversity by different notions of
diversity.
• To propose a clustering-based algorithm for k-anonymization resulting in
local recoding with minimum information loss.
• To extend clustering k-anonymization algorithm to be applicable for various
instances of l-diversity principles.
To address the above objectives, we propose a framework for privacy diagnosis
and preservation in data publishing as described in the next section.
For the sake of simplicity, only one attribute is considered as sensitive attribute
in this study. However, as explained in (Gal et al., 2008), definitions and algorithms
can be straightforwardly extended to multiple sensitive attributes. Moreover, for
measuring the anonymity, monotonicity property, lemmas and proofs are given for
k-anonymity and 3 representative principles of l-diversity. The same properties
and proofs have to be considered for various l-diversity principles, if necessary.
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1.4 Privacy diagnosis and preservation framework
The general framework of privacy diagnosis and preservation in data publishing is
given in Figure 1.2. This framework consists of two major parts, namely Privacy
Diagnosis Centre and Privacy Preservation Module. The diagnosis centre will
be used for measuring of the k-anonymity and l-diversity principles level and
diagnosing privacy threats, whereas preservation module is for modifying data
to guarantee desired k-anonymity and l-diversity level. The initial data (private
data) and privacy parameters, if any, are given by data holder as input. Then the
framework is used either for measuring the level of target privacy principle and
showing privacy risks, or for applying privacy preservation methods for protecting
privacy of published data. Hence, the output may be privacy principles level,
privacy threats, (e.g. by giving positive and negative borders), generalized data
according to demand privacy level, or any combination of them.
Figure 1.2: General framework for privacy diagnosis and privacy preservation
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1.5 Thesis contributions
Below are the key contributions of this thesis:
I) Privacy diagnosing:
We propose the idea of a privacy diagnosis centre that offers the necessary
framework for the exploratory analysis of the data and various publication
scenarios. Such a diagnosis centre should answer to questions about existing level
of k-anonymity and l-diversity of data. It also should explore the data to indicate
privacy threats by giving subset of attributes that can be published safely and/or
jeopardize privacy.
II) Enhancing k-anonymization by two-phase clustering:
We propose a clustering based k-anonymization method and show its efficiency
and effectiveness. This greedy clustering algorithm considers defects of both
small and big clusters. A two-phase clustering k-anonymization algorithm will
be introduced accordingly.
III) Enhancing l-diversification by bucket clustering:
We show deficiency of recent proposed l-diversification methods which are trying
to extend k-anonymization for supporting various principles of l-diversity. We
benefit from two already proposed anonymization algorithms, namely greedy k-
member clustering (Byun et al., 2006a) and Anatomy (Xiao and Tao, 2006a). We
also show how an algorithm can be devised to achieve frequency l-diversity with
less information loss while guaranteeing successful termination. Accordingly, a
bucket clustering frequency l-diversification algorithm is introduced.
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1.6 Structure of the thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, some of the basic notions of anonymity and diversity and
state-of-the-art studies in this field are reviewed. Related works in both identity
disclosure and attribute disclosure are covered by concentrating on different
aspects of the problem considered by each proposed technique.
Chapter 3 describes three main proposals of the thesis in different subsections.
Firstly, devised privacy diagnosis centre is introduced by proposing the necessary
framework for measuring k-anonymity. The diagnosis centre is advanced to aim at
diversity diagnosis. Secondly, two-phase clustering k-anonymization algorithm is
introduced. It includes relaxing phase allowing clusters to become big and splitting
phase dividing big clusters, both results in less information loss. Finally, frequency
l-diversity modification process is addressed by introducing bucket clustering l-
diversification algorithm. It exploits some criteria resulting in less information loss
meanwhile assuring termination.
Chapter 4 presents experimental results of the implemented algorithms followed
by their analysis and discussion. Benefits and effectiveness of algorithms are
explained by some examples and cases, especially by the vast range of questions
that can be answered by diagnosis centre. Then, algorithms are run with a set of
actual datasets and their effectiveness and efficiency are empirically shown. Each
part is followed by analysis of the results and discussion.
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Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation and outlines the directions for the future
researches.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, state-of-the-art studies in the field of privacy preservation and
privacy diagnosis in data publishing are surveyed. In Section 2.1, process of
data publishing is explained to show the privacy violation and need of privacy
preservation, when the data is published for third parties. Then, definition of
the privacy preservation principles following their features and techniques are
explained in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, lack of the privacy measuring is shown
that leads to proposing the privacy diagnosis centre. The chapter is summarized
with justifying the need of a framework for privacy diagnosis and preservation
in data publishing in Section 2.4. The outline of the chapter is shown by the
taxonomy in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of related studies in privacy diagnosis and preservation
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2.1 Data publishing
A typical scenario of data publishing is shown in Figure 2.2. There are three
important actors in the process of data publishing, namely individual entities, data
owner and third party. Individuals are any kind of entities, specifically people,
that data belongs to them and contains their properties. They are usually named
microdata in literatures. Data owner (or data holder) is one who collects the
data and has this right to use them without worry about privacy concern. Third
parties (or data recipients) are other data recipients such as research centers or
organization that need the data for more exploration and analysis, or to extract new
knowledge from it. For example, when a hospital collects the data and publishes
it for investigation of an epidemic of a disease, “patients” are the individuals,
“hospital manager” is the data owner and another “medical center” that receives
the data is the third party.
Figure 2.2: Data publication process
As a very simple privacy issue, direct identity of individuals such as “Name”
and “Social security number” are generally removed or replaced by random values
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before publishing to third parties. However, this de-identification process is not
enough because of existence of quasi-identifiers that can result in disclosure
of identity and sensitive information of individuals. More attentions need to
be considered before publishing the data to prevent privacy breaches. Privacy
preservation exactly aims at this problem by introducing methods and techniques
to publish the data and guarantee anonymity. In fact, in the process of safe data
publishing by privacy preservation, some modifications are necessary to convert
the initial microdata (that data owner has) to released data (that data recipient is
received), as shown in Figure 2.3
Figure 2.3: Privacy preservation in data publishing
2.2 Privacy preservation
In data publishing, privacy preservation exactly aims at the problem of sharing
data with guarantee of anonymity. It considers how data owner can publish data
without compromising the privacy of individuals and business entities reflected in
the data. It addresses privacy concerns in data published to third parties with the
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smallest possible modification in the initial data and simultaneously guaranteeing
anonymity of individuals. In this section, main principles, important features
and introduced techniques for privacy preservation are explained. Necessary
definitions and algorithms are also given to show their deficiency and drawback
leading to the proposing of the privacy preservation algorithms.
2.2.1 Principles
k-anonymity and l-diversity are two main principles of privacy preservation in data
publishing. The process of data modification resulting in these principles is named
k-anonymization and l-diversification respectively. These two principles and their
variations will be reviewed in next subsections.
2.2.1.1 k-anonymity
In k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002b), data privacy is guaranteed by ensuring that any
record in the released data is indistinguishable from at least k−1 other records with
respect to the quasi-identifier. Clearly, a join with a k-anonymous table would give
rise to k or more matches and creates confusion. Thus, an individual is hidden in
a crowd of size k giving k-anonymity. It also means that the identity disclosure
risk is at most 1k for join class of attacks. This aspect of privacy preserving is also
referred to as protecting identity disclosing in some studies, such as (Truta et al.,
2005, 2006). The main objective of k-anonymity is to anonymize a table so that
nobody can make high-probability associations between records in the table and
the corresponding entities.
17
Almost all literatures ((Sweeney, 2002b; LeFevre et al., 2005; Lodha and
Thomas, 2006) to cite a few) mention that the quasi-identifier and non-sensitive
attributes are determined based on background information such as previous data
releases, knowledge of potential adversary, or the content of externally available
data. Therefore, we assume identity attributes of the table has been removed
and sensitive attributes are given by data holder based on his/her background
and domain knowledge. Moreover, non-sensitive attributes do not play any role
from the privacy preservation point of view and we can ignore them without loss
of generality. Hence, given table has two subsets of attributes: quasi-identifier
attributes and sensitive attributes. It can be shown by T{Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qd,S1,S2, . . . ,Sm}
where {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qd} is quasi-identifier set (QA) and {S1,S2, . . . ,Sm} is sensitive
attributes set (SA). Privacy preservation is about protecting re-identification of
individuals’ identifier based on their quasi-identifier and also preventing disclosure
of sensitive attributes values.
As a simple definition, table T{QA,SA} is k-anonymous with respect to a
quasi-identifier QA if and only if each distinct set of values in QA appears at least
k times in T (Sweeney, 2002b; Byun et al., 2006a; Lodha and Thomas, 2006). It
means every record in a k-anonymous table is indistinguishable from at least k−1
other records with respect to the quasi-identifier set. A group of records that are
indistinguishable to each other is named an equivalence class.
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Definition 2.1 (Equivalence class with respect to a set of attributes).
Given an instance r1 of a relation R2 and a set of attributes Q ⊆ R; e ⊆ r is an
equivalence class with respect to Q if and only if e is the multi-set of tuples in r
that agree on the values of their attributes in Q. The empty equivalence class is
ignored.
According to this definition, equivalence classes are the equivalence classes of
the relation “having the same values for the attributes in Q” on tuples. The notion
induces a partitioning of r. This notion is used in (Byun et al., 2006a; Li et al.,
2006; Wong et al., 2006), to cite a few.
In this study, r(Q,s) refers to the instance r of R in which s ∈ R is the sensitive
attribute3, Q ⊆ R is the set of non-sensitive attributes and s 6∈ Q. r(R), or r, is
used when the sensitive attribute doesn’t exist or is not targeted, for the sake of
simplicity.
Definition 2.2 (k-anonymity).
Given an integer k, an instance r of a relation R is k-anonymous with respect to
Q′ ⊆ Q if and only if the cardinality of every equivalence class with respect to Q′
is greater than or equal to k and r is not k+1-anonymous.
This definition of k-anonymity is compatible with but not identical to the
definitions given in other papers such as (Sweeney, 2002b; Byun et al., 2006a;
LeFevre et al., 2006a). This is a recursive definition that chooses k to be exactly
1r is a multi-set (i.e. it can contain duplicates).
2R is both the name of a relation and its schema (i.e. a set of attributes).
3This work is easily extended to multiple sensitive attributes (combinations of attributes).
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the minimum cardinality of an equivalence class with respect to Q′. Without this
recursion (“not k+1 anonymous”), an instance which is k-anonymous would also
be k-1-anonymous. With the recursive definition, it is not the case.
Enforced by the k-anonymity requirement, it is guaranteed that even though an
adversary knows that a k-anonymous table T contains the record of a particular
individual and also knows values of the quasi-identifier attributes, he/she cannot
determine which record in T corresponds to the individual with a probability
greater than 1k .
The k-anonymity requirement is typically enforced through generalization,
where real values are replaced with “less specific but semantically consistent
values” (Sweeney, 2002b) from the domain of each attribute. This process is
usually named data modification. There are various ways to modify the values
of each domain. For instance, “Zip” codes ‘47907’ and ‘47903’can be generalized
to ‘4790*’ (i.e., replacing least significant digit by * to cover a set of values), or
even may be generalized to ‘*’, that is a range covering every possible values. This
is usually referred to as value suppression.
2.2.1.2 l-diversity
Although k-anonymity is helpful for protecting identity of individuals, a k-
anonymous table can still be attacked to disclose sensitive information of individuals.
For instance, if all patients of an equivalence class have the same disease, one
can understand disease of a victim, though it is not possible to infer his/her actual
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identifier. It motivated researchers to consider more sophisticated models to protect
the association of individuals to sensitive information rather than k-anonymity.
This anonymity principle is named l-diversity (Loukides and Shao, 2007; Xiao
and Tao, 2006a; Kifer and Gehrke, 2006; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Wong et al.,
2006). l-diversity is defined with respect to the sensitive attributes. It requires that
each value of the sensitive attribute s in an equivalence class with respect to Q be
“well-represented”. Different instances of l-diversity differ in their realization of
the property of “well-represented”-ness. For example, as shown in (Xiao and Tao,
2006a), when the number of sensitive values of an attribute in a class of tuples is l,
sensitive value of an individual can be inferred with probability 1l , not
1
k , even the
data is k-anonymous with k > l.
While k-anonymity prevents identification, l-diversity aims at protecting sensitive
information. Iyengar (2002) characterizes k-anonymity and l-diversity as identity
disclosure and attribute disclosure, respectively (Iyengar, 2002). While the
former tries to prevent disclosing of identity of individuals, the latter tries to
protect association of individuals to their sensitive values. l-diversity guarantees
that one cannot associate an object with sensitive information beyond a certain
probability. This is achieved by ensuring that values of sensitive attributes are
“well represented” as per the l-diversity principle declared in (Machanavajjhala
et al., 2006).
Different instances of this principle, together with corresponding transformation
processes, have been proposed. For instance, distinct l-diversity (Li et al., 2007),
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entropy l-diversity and recursive (c,l)-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006),
(α ,k)-anonymity (Wong et al., 2006), and t-closeness (Li et al., 2007) are some
of the proposed instances. Confusingly, the name l-diversity is sometimes used by
authors to refer to some of the above instances rather than to the general principle.
The simplest instance of l-diversity counts the number of distinct values of the
sensitive attribute in each equivalence class and requires that it be bigger or equal
to l. Distinct l-diversity has been defined and used in some previous studies such
as (Li et al., 2007; Ghinita et al., 2007; Truta and Vinay, 2006).
Definition 2.3 (Distinct l-diversity).
An instance r(Q, s) of a relation R is distinct l-diverse if and only if for each
equivalence class e with respect to Q:
|{v|v ∈ dom(s)∧∃t(t ∈ e∧ t.s = v)}| ≥ l ,
where dom(s) is the domain of the attribute s4.
Another important and more applicable interpretation of l-diversity requires
that each value of the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class e appears at
most |e|/l times in e. We call and refer to this form of l-diversity as “frequency
l-diversity” in order to differentiate it from other definitions, although this name is
not originally used by the authors using the notion (Xiao and Tao, 2006a; Ghinita
et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2006).
4Two surrounding mid symbols “| · · · |” are used to denote cardinality.
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Definition 2.4 (Frequency l-diversity).
An instance r(Q,s) of a relation R is frequency l-diverse if and only if for each
equivalence class e with respect to Q and each possible value v ∈ adom(s):
p(e,v)≤ 1
l
,
where adom(s) = {v|v ∈ dom(s)∧∃t(t ∈ e∧ t.s = v)}, the active domain of s, and
p(e,v) = |{{t|t ∈ e∧ t.s = v}}|/|e| (note that e is a multi-set 5.
Machanavajjhala et al. (2006) propose entropy l-diversity and recursive (c,l)-
diversity. Recursive (c,l)-diversity assures that “the most frequent value of
sensitive attribute in each equivalence class is not too frequent, and the less
frequent doesn’t appear too rare” (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006). Let m be the
number of sensitive values in an equivalence class and ri is the frequency of the ith
most frequent values. A table is (c,l)-diverse if and only if, for each equivalence
class, r1 < c(rl + rl+1 + . . .+ rm), that is, number of occurrences of the most
frequent sensitive value in each equivalence class is less than the sum of the
frequencies of the m− l + 1 least frequent sensitive values, multiplied by a user
defined constant c.
Entropy l-diversity is another variant of l-diversity principle. It measures the
closeness of the distribution of values of the sensitive attribute in each equivalence
class to the uniform distribution. It requires its entropy (as used in information
theory) be bigger than log(l) for a given l.
5The opening and closing double curly brackets “{{· · ·}}” are used to denote a multi-set.
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Definition 2.5 (Entropy l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006)).
An instance r(Q,s) of a relation R is entropy l-diverse if and only if for each
equivalence class e with respect to Q:
H(e)≥ log(l) ,
where H(e)=− ∑
v∈adom(s)
p(e,v) log(p(e,v)) is the entropy of the equivalence class,
adom(s) is the active domain of s and p(e,v) = |{{t|t ∈ e ∧ t.s = v}}|/|e| is
the fraction of tuples in e with sensitive value equal to v (as in Definition 2.4).
Consider p(e,v) log(p(e,v) is 0 if p(e,v) is 0.
Wong et al. (2006) proposed another model for protecting the association
between individuals and sensitive information. They named their model (α ,k)-
anonymity (Wong et al., 2006), that actually is one extension of l-diversity problem
by extending the Incognito (LeFevre et al., 2005). They defined a new notion,
α-de-association requirement, as a value that shows which degree of diversity
exists in the sensitive attribute of the tuples in an equivalence class. It shows
that frequency of a sensitive value, s, in every equivalence class is less than α .
Actually what is considered in (Wong et al., 2006) as sensitive information is only
some of the values of sensitive attribute. Then, the problem that they addressed
is preventing association between quasi-identifier and sensitive values instead of
considering all values of the sensitive attribute. (α ,k)-anonymity, is a special kind
of frequency l-diversity but for the selected values of the sensitive attributes known
to be sensitive values.
24
